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The Impact of Social Security Reform on Women's
Economic Security
Karen C. Burket
Grayson MP. McCouchtt
INTRODUCTION
For most Americans, social security represents an essential
source of economic security in retirement and old age. The existing
system, however, faces severe long-term financial problems, and there
is substantial disagreement over the appropriate direction and scope of
reform. Several current proposals recommend some form of
privatization, which could have important consequences for women.
Proponents argue that women would fare better under a privatized
system; critics warn that women would lose much of the protection
provided by the existing system. This article examines the potential
impact of reform proposals on women in their roles as workers, wives,
and widows. Part One considers issues of social adequacy and
individual equity, focusing on spousal and survivor benefits under the
existing system. Part Two analyzes the implications for women of
specific privatization proposals, and Part Three explores alternative
options for providing better protection for women against the risk of
poverty in old age. In conclusion, the article suggests that incremental
reform of the existing system may be the best way to reconcile
competing goals of adequacy and equity.
I. THE EXISTING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON WOMEN
A. Women as Workers, Wives, and Widows
Under the existing system, benefits for retired workers and
their families are financed primarily from payroll taxes imposed at a
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flat rate on the wages of current workers.' The basic benefit payable
to a retired worker is determined by applying a progressive benefit
formula to the worker's covered earnings.2 In addition, a current or
former spouse of a retired worker may be eligible for a 50 percent
spousal benefit, and a surviving spouse may be eligible for a 100
percent survivor benefit.3 The existing system is often criticized for
favoring one-earner couples over two-earner couples. Due to the
progressive benefit formula, a one-earner couple may receive higher
total benefits than a two-earner couple with identical total wages.4
Consider two hypothetical couples, the One-Earners and the Two-
Earners, who are similarly situated except that in the former couple all
wages are earned by the husband and in the latter couple the wages are
earned equally by the husband and the wife. The two couples'
respective monthly earnings and benefits are summarized as follows:5
The payroll tax is imposed at a flat rate of 12.4 percent. Half the tax is
collected from the employer, and half is withheld from the worker's wages. For 1999, the
maximum amount of wages subject to the payroll tax is $72,600. See 26 U.S.C. §§
3101(a), 311 l(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 430 (1994).
2 For workers retiring in 1997, the basic old age benefit, known as the
"primary insurance amount" (PIA), is equal to 90 percent of the first $455 of "average
indexed monthly earnings" (AIME), plus 32 percent of the next $2,286 of AIME, plus 15
percent of the balance of covered AIME. The monthly benefit is equal to the PIA,
rounded down to the nearest whole dollar. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 415(a), (b), (e), (g)(1994); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., 2d SESS., 1998
GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 25 (Comm. Print 1998). The old
age benefit attributable to a retired worker's own earnings record is referred to here as a
"worker benefit," to avoid confusion with spousal and survivor benefits.
' See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c), (e), (f) (1994).
4 See RICHARD V. BURKHAUSER & TIMOTHY M. SMEEDING, SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM: A BUDGET NEUTRAL APPROACH TO REDUCING OLDER WOMEN'S
DISPROPORTIONATE RISK OF POVERTY 10-11 (Policy Brief No. 2/1994) (Syracuse Univ.,
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Center for Policy Research, 1994).
5 For simplicity, the illustration assumes that the workers in both couples
retire in 1997, when the workers (and their spouses) are age 65.
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One-Earners Two-Earners
Earnings Benefits Earnings Benefits
Husband $2,000 $903.90 $1,000 $ 583,90
Wife 0 451.95 1,000 583.90
Total $2,000 $1,355.85 $2,000 $1,167.80
Furthermore, under the "dual-entitlement rule," a secondary earner's
total benefit cannot exceed the greater of her own worker benefit or
her spousal (or survivor) benefit.6 Viewing the secondary earner's
benefit as a financial return on her payroll contributions, critics argue
that the secondary earner's contributions are wasted to the extent that
they fail to generate an increase in her total benefit.
7
The disparity between one-earner and two-earner couples may
become even more pronounced after the death of one spouse, when
the survivor becomes entitled to a survivor benefit equal to the
deceased spouse's worker benefit (to the extent it exceeds the
survivor's own worker benefit, if any).8 In the above example,
assuming the husband dies first, Mrs. One-Earner becomes entitled to
a survivor benefitof $903.90 (67 percent of the couple's original
combined benefits). By contrast, Mrs. Two-Earner continues to
receive her own worker benefit of $583.90 (50 percent of the couple's
original combined benefits); since her worker benefit was equal to that
of her deceased husband, she receives no additional survivor benefit.
Thus, the $188.05 difference between the two couples' total benefits
while both spouses are living widens to $320 after the death of the
husband. For couples between the extremes represented by the One-
Earners and the Two-Earners, the disparities in benefits are less
6 Technically, the secondary earner's spousal benefit is reduced (but not
below zero) by the amount of her own worker benefit. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(k)(3) (1994).
7 See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at
Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983, 998-99 (1993).
8 See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 4, at 10-1I.
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pronounced. 9
The disparate treatment of one-earner and two-earner couples
is often seen as evidence of a systematic bias in favor of "traditional"
families with husbands as breadwinners and wives as homemakers.'
0
Historically, however, the system of spousal and survivor benefits was
justified in terms of social welfare, reflecting the presumed
dependency of married women."I These "derivative" benefits,
enacted in 1939, loosened the original linkage between payroll
contributions and benefits and introduced an "income-transfer"
component similar to other social welfare programs.' 2 Furthermore,
despite the absence of means testing, the dual-entitlement rule
operates in much the same way as a "benefit offset" provision in other
welfare programs.'
3
In the aggregate, social security has a markedly redistributive
impact in favor of women. 14 Since women tend to earn lower wages
and live longer than men, they receive disproportionately favorable
treatment under the progressive benefit formula and the system of
spousal and survivor benefits. The redistributive features of the
benefit structure are grounded in considerations of social adequacy.
9 See 1 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SECURITY REP. 143 (1997)
[hereinafter ADVISORY COUNCIL REP.] (statement of Edith U. Fierst) (noting inverse
relationship between level of secondary earner's wages and level of survivor benefits).
'0 See McCaffery, supra note 7, at 998-1000.
1 See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Women, Fairness, and
Social Security, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1214-15 (1997).
12 See Karen C. Holden, Women as Widows Under a Reformed Social
Security System, in PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 356, 357 (Olivia S.
Mitchell et al. eds., 1999).13 See id. (noting the offset for income earned by a retired worker above a
specified level). The dual-entitlement rule could be recast as leaving the spousal benefit
intact while imposing a 100 percent tax on the secondary earner's own worker benefit, up
to the amount of the spousal or survivor benefit. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 11,
at 1214 n. 25.
14 As a group, women are "net gainers" from the system in the sense that they
receive a disproportionately high level of benefits compared to their contributions. See
Laura E. Stiglin, A Classic Case of Overreaction: Women and Social Security, NEW ENG.
ECON. REV. 29, 31 (Jan.-Feb. 1981). Women make around 28 percent of all social
security contributions, and receive around 54 percent of total benefits. See Alicia H.
Munnell & Laura E. Stiglin, Women and a Two-Tier Social Security System, in A
CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL SECURITY: THE CHANGING ROLES OF WOMEN AND MEN IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 101, 106 (Richard V. Burkhauser & Karen C. Holden eds., 1982).
378 [Vol. XVI
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At present, 13.1 percent of elderly women live in poverty; without
social security, according to one recent study, the poverty rate for this
group would be 52.2 percent.'
5
Nevertheless, even with the benefits provided under the
existing system, the poverty rate for elderly women remains almost
twice as high as for elderly men.1 6  Even more striking is the gap
between married couples and unmarried individuals. While married
couples are likely to enjoy relative well-being in retirement, widows
and other unmarried women face a significant economic risk of
poverty. 17 Indeed, the poverty rate for elderly unmarried women may
be almost four times as high as for elderly married couples.' 8 Social
security may fairly be described as "overprotect[ing] married couples
and underprotect[ing] survivors, most of whom are women."' 9 Thus,
the substantial improvement in the economic well-being of the elderly
as a group in recent decades should not obscure the substantial and
persistent disparities in income distribution within the group.
Women's participation , in the work force has risen
dramatically in the last few decades. By one recent estimate, 59
percent of women age 16 or older now participate in the work force,
15 See NAT'L ECON. COUNCIL, INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOC.
SECURITY, WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 7 (1998) (hereinafter NAT'L ECON.
COUNCIL) (noting that the poverty rate for elderly women was 13.1 percent in 1997 (18.0
percent for elderly widows); without social security benefits, the poverty rate for elderly
women would have been 52.2 percent (60.6 percent for elderly widows)).
16 See id. at 5 (noting 1997 poverty rate of 13.1 percent for elderly women,
7.0 percent for elderly men); Peter A. Diamond, The Economics of Social Security
Reform, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS
38, 46 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998) (noting 1992 poverty rate of 15.7 percent for
elderly women, 8.9 percent for elderly men).
17 See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 4, at 7-9.
18 See NAT'L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 12 (noting 1997 poverty rate
of 22.2 percent for elderly divorced women, 20.0 percent for elderly never-married
womeh, and 18.0 percent for elderly widows, compared to 4.6 percent for elderly married
couples); see also Steven H. Sandell & Howard M. lams, Reducing Women's Poverty by
Shifting Social Security Benefits from Retired Couples to Widows, 16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 279, 281 (1997) (noting that "[ploverty is three to four times more likely
among unmarried women than married women").
19 See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 4, at 12 (noting that "income
security policy has consistently offered the greatest level of protection to traditional
married men").
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compared with 75 percent of men. 20  This trend is matched by an
increase in the number of women receiving benefits based in whole or
in part on their own earnings records. According to one recent study,
over 36 percent of women age 62 or older receive worker-only
benefits, and over 25 percent are "dually entitled.",21 By the same
token, the importance of spousal benefits within the existing system
appears to be declining.22  Nevertheless, despite these trends,
important differences are likely to persist in the work patterns and
social security benefits of women compared to those of men.
23
Women may continue to increase their participation in the work force,
but they will remain more likely than men to work intermittently or
part-time. The wage differential between men and women may
continue to diminish, but, on average, women will continue to earn
significantly less than men. 24  Moreover, the expected increase in
divorce or separation threatens to exacerbate the problem of poverty
among elderly unmarried women
2 5
20 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: IMPLICATIONS FOR
WOMEN'S RETIREMENT INCOME 5 (1997) (citing 1996 rates of participation, up from 38
percent for women and 83 percent for men 35 years earlier). But cf id. at 6 (noting that
the rate of increase in labor force participation for younger women has slowed).
21 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SOCIAL SECURITY: ISSUES INVOLVING BENEFIT
EQUITY FOR WORKING WOMEN 37 (1996) (citing 1993 statistics). A retired worker is
"dually entitled" if she is entitled to receive both a worker benefit based on her own
earnings record and an additional derivative benefit as a spouse or survivor. Id. See also
Sandell & lams, supra note 18, at 282.
22 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SOCIAL SECURITY: DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR
ADDRESSING PROGRAM INSOLVENCY 60 (1998) (stating that "the role of spousal benefits
within the existing program structure may be declining in importance").
23 See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and
Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2062 (1996) (noting that, despite
increased participation in the work force, "[e]ven younger generations of women ... do
not duplicate men's patterns of market work").
24 Since 1980, the ratio of women's to men's median full-time covered
earnings has risen from around 60 percent to around 70 percent. See U.S. GEN. ACCT.
OFF., supra note 21, at 31; see also Lois SHAW ET AL., THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM ON WOMEN 14 (Institute for Women's Policy Research, 1998) (noting that,
despite increased work experience, women still tend to work fewer full-time years and
earn lower wages than men).
25 See SHAW, supra note 24, at 14.
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B. Social Adequacy and Individual Equity
From the outset, the social security system has sought to
accommodate conflicting goals of "social adequacy" and "individual
equity." During the system's long "start-up" phase, when nearly all
participants received a generous return on their payroll contributions,
the benefit structure achieved wide acceptance. More recently,
however, concerns about long-term financial solvency and declining
rates of return have focused attention on inequities and inefficiencies
in the existing system. In particular, the role of spousal and survivor
benefits has come under renewed scrutiny from several quarters.
Viewed from the perspective of social adequacy, the spousal
benefit provisions function poorly. 26 When these provisions were first
enacted in 1939, relatively few women worked outside the home and
it may have seemed reasonable to view. spousal benefits as an anti-
27poverty measure. Today, however, it is difficult to justify spousal
benefits for one-earner families on the basis of need. Such benefits
are paid primarily to spouses of high-wage workers who tend to have
access to tax-favored pension plans and other sources of private
savings.28 Spousal benefits also cannot be viewed as an imputed or
"shadow" wage for housework performed by the spouse, since the
amount of such benefits rises proportionately with the primary
earner's own worker benefit.29 Spousal benefits are often inversely
26 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 11, at 1230.
27 See Peter W. Martin, Social Security Benefits for Spouses, 63 CORNELL L.
REv. 789, 799-800 (noting that spousal benefits "could reasonably have been called an
antipoverty measure"). See also Karen C. Holden, Social Security and the Economic
Security of Women: Is It Fair?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 91, 98-99 (Eric
R. Kingson & James H. Schulz eds., 1997); Burke & McCouch, supra note 11, at 1214-
15 (noting early expectation that spousal benefits would wither away as more women
entered the work force and became entitled to worker benefits).
28 See Holden, supra note 27, at 99; see also Karen C. Holden, Supplemental
OASI Benefits to Homemakers Through Current 'Spouse Benefits, a Homemaker Credit,
and Child-Care Drop-Out Years, in A CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL SECURITY: THE CHANGING
ROLES OF WOMEN AND MEN IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 41, 48 (Richard V. Burkhauser &
Karen C. Holden eds., 1982) (hereinafter Holden, Supplemental OASI Benefits) (noting
that spousal benefits "are not paid primarily to beneficiary couples most in need of
additional income").
29 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 11, at 1229-30. See also C. EUGENE
STEUERLE & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
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related to need, resulting in an upside-down subsidy to middle-and
high-income couples - a "dubious redistributive achievement.
3°
It is also impossible to justify the existing spousal benefit
provisions on grounds of individual equity. In an actuarially fair
system, married couples would bear the cost of spousal benefits
through higher payroll taxes. Because unmarried individuals in effect
purchase "redundant" spousal and survivor benefits, the existing
system confers only a marriage bonus and no marriage penalty. 3' The.
spousal benefit provisions redistribute from unmarried individuals to
married couples and from two-earner couples to one-earner couples.32
In the case of a two-earner couple in which wages are split equally,
the couple's combined benefits are equal to twice the benefit received
by an unmarried individual with half the couple's combined wages.
Presumably, the cost of maintaining a given standard of living for a
married couple is less than twice the cost for an unmarried individual.
Any reduction in the two-earner couple's combined benefits would be
politically unattractive, however, due to the resulting marriage
penalty. Even so, if the two-earner couple's combined benefits are
presumptively adequate to satisfy their consumption needs, it is
difficult to justify providing higher benefits to a one-earner couple
with identical total wages.
33
Spousal benefits, though originally conceived as a
"supplemental transfer to more needy beneficiaries," 34  seem
increasingly anachronistic in view of women's changing role in the
workplace. By 2015, it isexpected that 60 percent of newly-retired
married women will receive worker-only benefits; 35 percent will be
RIGHT AND WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM 209 (1994).30 Richard V. Burkhauser, Alternative Social-Security Responses to the
Changing Roles of Women and Men, in CONTROLLING THE COST OF SOCIAL SECURITY 14 1,
146 (Colin D. Campbell ed., 1984).
31 See Burke & McCouch, supra note II, at 1230.
32 In the absence of spousal benefits, a one-earner couple might receive lower
benefits than an equal-income two-earner couple due to the progressive benefit formula;
thus, spousal benefits may tend to equalize the benefits received by one- and two-earner
couples with identical wages. See Holden, supra note 27, at 99.
33 See id. at 97; see also Michael D. Hurd, Adequacy and Equity Issues:
Another View, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 219, 223 (Eric R. Kingson &
James H. Schulz eds., 1997).
34 Holden, Supplemental QASI Benefits, supra note 28, at 5 1.
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dually-entitled; and only 5 percent will receive spouse-only benefits.35
Abstracting for the moment from transitional problems, it would seem
perverse to tailor a system of spousal benefits to match the experience
of a distinct minority of married women. A more rational benefit
structure would take into account the increasing participation of
women in the work force and the reduced wage differential between
spouses. For example, the spousal benefit might be scaled back from
50 percent to 33 1/3 percent of the primary worker benefit for low-
and moderate-wage couples, and capped or eliminated for high-wage
couples.
3 6
Even if spousal benefits recede in importance, survivor
benefits are likely to continue to play a significant role. Under the
dual-entitlement rule, most widows are likely to receive survivor
benefits based on their husbands' earnings records. Even women who
initially receive benefits based in whole or in part on their own
earnings records upon retirement will typically switch to survivor
benefits when they become widows, since their own workers' benefits
are unlikely to exceed those of their husbands.3 7  Thus, for most
women, increased participation in the work force is unlikely to
generate higher survivor benefits; indeed, more equal sharing of
earnings between spouses may actually erode the value of survivor
benefits.3
8
The existing system of survivor benefits is open to criticism,
especially on grounds of social adequacy. Although the causes of
poverty among widows are complex and incompletely understood, it
35 See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 143 (statement of Edith U.
Fierst).
36 See U.S. GEN. ACCT.' OFF., supra note 21, at 45-46; see also STEUERLE &
BAKIJA, supra note 29, at 214 (suggesting cap on spousal benefits for high-wage couples).
37 See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 142 (statement of Edith U.
Fierst). This pattern is not expected to change greatly in future generations because, on
average, (1) women's earnings will continue to be lower than men's and (2) women's work
careers will continue to be shorter than men's. Only around 20 percent of married women
retiring in 2015 are expected to have worker benefits greater than those of their husbands.
Id.
38 See Holden, supra note 27, at 98 ("Ironically, increased sharing of earning
roles between spouses, assumed to increase women's access to protective wage-based
insurance, substantially lowers the economic protection provided to them as widows.
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is clear that many married women face a significantly increased risk
of poverty following the death of their husbands. 39 According to one
estimate, the cost of maintaining a given standard of living for a
surviving spouse is around 80 percent of the total cost for a married
couple.4° Social security benefits ranging from 50 percent to 67
percent of the couple's combined benefits fall short of this
benchmark. The steep drop in social security benefits may be an
important factor in explaining the high rate of poverty among widows.
Since almost two-thirds of elderly women in poverty are widows,
improving survivor benefits would be one way of addressing the
needs of a particularly vulnerable group. 4 1 Any reform of survivor
benefits should also attempt to remedy the existing disparity in
replacement rates between one-earner and two-earner married
couples.
C. Earnings Sharing
In the debate over social security reform, the concept of
"earnings sharing" emerges as a constantly recurring theme.a4 In
general, earnings sharing would treat each spouse as earning one-half
of the couple's combined wages during marriage, thereby reallocating
a portion of the higher-wage spouse's earnings record to the lower-
wage spouse. One corollary would be the elimination of spousal
benefits, since each spouse would be entitled to worker benefits based
on one-half of the couple's combined earnings. Furthermore, under
39 See Sandell & lams, supra note 18, at 281; Holden, supra note 12, at 361
("Why women on average suffer a large decline in income upon their husbands' deaths is
not fully understood."). See also Michael D. Hurd, Research on the Elderly Economic
Status, Retirement, and Consumption Saving, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 565, 582-85 (1990)
(discussing causes of poverty among widows, including low lifetime earnings).
40 See NAT'L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 14 (noting that official
poverty thresholds imply that a widow needs 79 percent of couple's income to maintain
pre-widowhood consumption level). Other factors contributing to widows' increased risk
of poverty include (I) poor economic status prior to widowhood, (2) loss of a husband's
pension income, and (3) decline in income from other assets. Id.
41 See Sandell & lams, supra note 18, at 279-80 (noting that SSI would be
more target efficient but that significant increases in SSI are unlikely given the current
budget and political outlook).
42 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 11, at 1232-37. See also U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFF., supra note 2 1, at 4 1-43.
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most earnings sharing proposals, a surviving spouse would inherit the
deceased spouse's earnings record accumulated during marriage.
43
Although earnings sharing has been widely recognized as a
technically viable solution for some of the most vexing problems in
the existing benefit structure, political obstacles to its implementation
have so far proved insurmountable. 4
In terms of "winners" and "losers," earnings sharing would
produce gains for two-earner couples, primarily at the expense of one-
earner couples.45  Specific proposals have included special
adjustments, based on elaborate simulations, to mitigate hardship for
specific groups of women, but one unanticipated consequence of such
fine tuning has been to call attention to potential losers who have
rallied in support of the existing benefit structure.46 Some critics
argue that the benefits of earnings sharing would be achieved only in
the long run, when women's increased work force participation might
have mitigated many of the problems that earnings sharing seeks to
address.47  Others question whether the view of marriage as an
economic "partnership" is sufficiently widespread to justify any
earnings sharing proposal.48
The earnings sharing debate illustrates the difficulty of
implementing comprehensive reform and the inevitability of tradeoffs
between conflicting objectives. 49 Most proponents of earnings sharing
43 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 11, at 1233. See also U.S. GEN. ACCT.
OFF., supra note 21, at 42 (noting that without inheritance of earnings credits, pure
earnings sharing would reduce benefits for many surviving spouses).
44 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 1I, at 1232-33.
45 See Jane A. Ross & Melinda M. Upp, The Treatment of Women in the
Social Security System, 1970-1988, in EQUAL TREATMENT IN SOCIAL SECURITY 69, 86-87
(Int'l Soc. Security Ass'n, 1988).
46 See id. at 88-89. One commentator notes that the earnings sharing
approach has failed to garner political support "[p]rimarily because the proposal is so well
balanced that no one is willing to fight for it. The winners and losers are individuals, not
groups." Id. See also Edith U. Fierst, Social Security and Women: Why Reasonableness
Doesn't Always Work, in 9 OF CURRENT INTEREST FROM THE POLICY CENTER ON AGING I,
8 (Brandeis Univ., The Heller School, Feb. 1990).
47 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 11, at 1235; Ross & Upp, supra note
45, at 89.
48 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 11, at 1235-36.
49 See Alstott, supra note 23, at 2066.
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recognize that under any revenue-neutral proposal benefits for one
group will necessarily come at the expense of other groups. At the
same time, any "no-loser" proposal that would increase benefits for
some groups without cutting benefits for others seems unrealistic,
given current concerns about the system's long-term financial
solvency. If "leveling up" is no longer a viable solution to conflicts
between competing constituencies, the prospects for implementing
any version of earnings sharing within the existing system look even
bleaker today than in the early 1980's.50
II. PRIVATIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON WOMEN
In the current social security debate, "privatization" generally
refers to the creation of individual private accounts with individual
control over investment of funds in the accounts.5 1 In a recent report,
the Advisory Council on Social Security proposes three alternative
approaches to social security reform. One of these proposals seeks to
retain the existing system more or less intact,52 while the other two
respectively recommend weaker and stronger versions of
privatization. The latter two proposals raise serious concerns about
the direction of social security reform and the impact of privatization
on women.
A. Privatization Proposals
The more moderate of the two privatization proposals, known
as the "individual account" (IA) plan, would retain the existing 12.4
50 But see McCaffery, supra note 7, at 1001 (announcing that policy
recommendations are "close at hand" and predicting that "the direction of change is
clear"). Whether earnings sharing would be a more viable option under a privatized
system remains unclear. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
51 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 22, at 31. Advance funding, though
often viewed as an important corollary of privatization, could also be accomplished under
the existing system by increasing the size of the trust funds. See Diamond, supra note 16,
at 57-61.
52 This proposal, known as the "maintain benefits" (MB) plan, seeks to
restore solvency by trimming back benefits and investing surplus social security funds in
the stock market. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 25-27. The MB plan
was generally supported by six members of the Advisory Council. See id at 25 n. 12.
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percent payroll tax to fund reduced social security benefits while
mandating an additional 1.6 percent payroll tax to fund private
accounts. 53 The more aggressive proposal, known as the "personal
security account" (PSA) plan, would retain the existing payroll tax but
would divert around 40 percent of amounts collected to fund private
accounts. The PSA plan would also replace the existing progressive
benefit structure with a two-tier structure comprisin a universal flat
minimum benefit supplemented by private accounts.
In terms of the basic benefit structure, the PSA plan would
have a considerably more drastic and immediate impact than the IA
plan. In general, the IA plan would preserve the existing structure of
workers' benefits - albeit at reduced levels - and would ensure at
least an adequate level of retirement income for most workers
regardless of the investment return on their private accounts. By
contrast, the first-tier benefit under the PSA plan would fall well
below the poverty level for a retired worker.5 5 The low first-tier
benefit flows from the decision to divert around 40 percent of payroll
tax collections to fund private accounts under the PSA plan. Critics
note that under the PSA plan the first-tier benefit would be
conspicuous, marginal, and ultimately vulnerable to reduction or
elimination.5 6 In the long run, the IA plan raises a similar concern that
introducing a defined-contribution component might ultimately
undermine the traditional defined-benefit component of the system. 57
53 See id. at 28-29. The IA plan would cut back disproportionately on
benefits for middle- and high-wage workers, thereby enhancing the progressivity of the
benefit formula. See id. at 29 (proposing that 32 percent and 15 percent brackets in
existing benefit formula be gradually cut back to 22.4 percent and 10.5 percent,
respectively). The IA plan was supported by two members of the Council, including the
Advisory Council's chairman, Edward M. Gramlich. Id at 28 n.14.
14 See id. at 30-33. Given the substantial diversion of payroll tax collections
to fund PSAs, it would be necessary to issue large amounts of government debt to pay
benefits to current recipients. To amortize this new borrowing, it would be necessary to
collect an additional 1.52 percent payroll tax over a 72-year period. id. at 30. The PSA
plan was supported by five members of the Council. Id. at 30 n.20.
5 The first-tier benefit would amount to $410 a month in 1996 dollars, or 65
percent of the poverty level for an elderly person living alone. See id. at 31.
56 See id. at 71; see also Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Great
Social Security Scare, 29 Am. PROSPECT 30-37 (Nov.-Dec. 1996).
, See Edward M. Gramlich, Reforming Social Security?, in POSITIONING
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The IA plan would revise the existing system of spousal and
survivor benefits. Under the IA plan, the surviving spouse would be
entitled to a benefit equal to the highest of (1) his or her own worker
benefit, (2) 100 percent of the deceased spouse's own worker benefit,
or (3) 75 percent of the couple's combined benefit prior to the first
spouse's death. 8  To offset a portion of the cost of the enhanced
survivor benefit, the IA plan would gradually reduce the spousal
benefit from 50 percent to 33 percent of the primary worker benefit.
59
Implicitly, the IA plan would, also shift a portion of the cost of the
enhanced survivor benefit to never-married workers who by definition
are ineligible for survivor benefits.6 °
Survivor benefits based on the couple's combined earnings
would improve the treatment of two-earner couples relative to one-
earner couples. Survivor benefits for one-earner couples would
remain unchanged -- the widow would still be entitled to a survivor
benefit equal to 100 percent of the deceased spouse's own worker
benefit.61  Two-earner couples, however, would receive enhanced
survivor benefits. In a couple in which wages were split equally, the
surviving spouse would be entitled to a benefit equal to 150 percent of
her own worker benefit.62  Depending on the relative wages of the
spouses in a two-earner couple, the surviving spouse's benefit,
expressed as a percentage of the couple's combined benefits, might be
PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 220, 226-27 (Michael S. Gordon et al. eds.,
1997).
58 See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 29.
59 Increasing survivor benefits to 75 percent of the couple's combined
benefits and reducing spousal benefits from 50 percent to 33 percent results in a net cost
of 0.15 percent of payroll, adding 7 percent to social security's long-term actuarial deficit.
See id at 19.
60 See Sandell & lams, supra note 18, at 286. Furthermore, by reducing the
spousal benefit the IA plan might have adverse consequences for divorced or separated
women. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 144-45 (statement of Edith U.
Fierst). See also SHAw, supra note 24, at 8-9.
61 While both spouses are alive, a one-earner couple would receive a
combined benefit equal to 133 percent of the primary earner's own worker benefit; after
the death of one spouse, the survivor would receive a benefit equal to 100 percent of the
deceased spouse's worker benefit (or, equivalently, 75 percent of the couple's 133 percent
combined benefits).
62 This is equivalent to 75 percent of the couple's combined 200 percent
benefit. By contrast, under present law, the widow would receive her own worker benefit
with no additional survivor benefit.
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higher but could never be lower than under current law. A widow
would receive a higher benefit whenever her own worker benefit
exceeded one-third of her husband's worker benefit.
63
Under the PSA plan, when fully phased in, the non-wage-
earning spouse in a one-earner couple would be entitled to a spousal
benefit equal to 50 percent of the flat minimum benefit. 64  The
survivor benefit would be set equal to 75 percent of the couple's
combined benefits, though the percentage would be calculated on a
much smaller base.65  Thus, for a one-earner couple, the survivor
benefit would be equal to 112.5 percent of the flat minimum benefit. 66
In the case of a two-earner couple in which both spouses had full
working careers (i.e., 35 years of covered employment), the survivor
benefit would be equal to 150 percent of the flat minimum benefit.67
The range of survivor benefits would be significantly less than the
average benefit currently paid to widows age 65 and older.6' And,
interestingly, the survivor benefit for a widow with no earnings record
of her own would be higher than the flat minimum benefit for a retired
worker.
The IA plan would require that benefits be paid in the form of
a single-life annuity (in the case of an unmarried worker) or a joint-
and-survivor annuity (in the case of a married worker, subject to
63 For example, if H and W were entitled to worker benefits of $12 and $4,
respectively, then after H's death W would receive a survivor benefit of $12, equal to 100
percent of H's worker benefit (or, equivalently, 75 percent of H's and W's $16 combined
benefits). If W's worker benefit were $8, she would receive a survivor's benefit of $15
(75 percent of $20); thus, a $4 increase in Ws worker benefit would generate a $3
increase in her survivor benefit (i.e., 75 percent of $4). See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP.,
supra note 9, at 145 (statement of Edith U. Fierst) (noting that under the IA plan the
amount of the survivor benefit would rise in proportion to the lower-wage spouse's
earnings record; the higher the secondary earner's own worker benefit, the higher the
survivor benefit).
64 See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 32.
65 See id.
66 A 112.5 percent survivor benefit is equivalent to 75 percent of 150 percent
of the flat minimum benefit. In 1996 dollars, this would amount to a monthly benefit of
$461.
67 A 150 percent survivor benefit is equivalent to 75 percent of 200 percent of
the flat minimum benefit. In 1996 dollars, this would amount to a monthly benefit of
$615.
68 See Holden, supra note 12, at 362.
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waiver with the spouse's consent). 69 By contrast, the PSA plan would
not require annuitization of private accounts and would apparently
permit workers to dispose by will of any balance remaining in their
private accounts at death. 70 Thus, a widow's survivor benefit might
(or might not) be supplemented by income from other sources,
including her own private account, an account inherited from her
deceased husband, or other savings. While some widows might do
quite well under such a system, the PSA plan would introduce new
risks and uncertainties for surviving spouses.
B. Women as Workers
A privatized system may pose special risks for women as
workers. Since women have, on average, lower wages and fewer
years of covered employment than men, they would generally fare less
well under any system that links retirement security more closely to
individual lifetime earnings. Conversely, women would generally
fare better under a system that maintains or enhances the existing
progressive distribution of benefits. On this score, it is likely that
most women workers would prefer the IA plan to the PSA plan, since
the IA plan privatizes a much smaller portion of the social security
system. By one recent estimate, the IA plan would reduce basic
benefits for the average earner by 17 percent, while the PSA plan
would reduce the basic first-tier benefit to around 47 percent of the
benefit paid to the average earner under the existing system. 71 The
difference flows from the fact that the PSA plan would divert a much
greater percentage of payroll taxes to private accounts and hence
require much more drastic benefit cuts in the non-privatized portion of
the system.
Some benefit reductions may fall more heavily on women
than on men. For example, if cost-of-living adjustments fell below
the rate of inflation, the greatest cumulative burden would fall on
long-lived individuals, typically elderly widows.72  Similarly,
69 See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 28.
70 See id at 32.
71 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE FINANCIAL WELL-BEING OF WOMEN 8 (1997) (statement of Jane L. Ross).
72 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 22, at 46-47 (noting that reduction in
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increasing the computation period for benefits from 35 to 38 or 40
years of covered employment would have a disproportionate impact
on women. By one estimate, less than 30 percent of women retiring
in 2020 will have 38 years of covered employment, compared to
almost 60 percent of men.73 Viewed separately, each particular
change in benefits may appear relatively minor, but, in the aggregate,
the proposed changes could significantly reduce benefits for women
relative to men.74
For women as workers, a crucial issue is whether the
additional amounts accumulated in their private accounts will offset
the reduced benefits under the non-privatized portion of the system.
Because women earn less than men, on average, their initial
contributions to private accounts will also be lower. The burden of
administrative expenses will fall disproportionately on small accounts,
further eroding their value. Furthermore, recent research suggests that
women may be more risk averse than men in making investment
decisions. 75 To the extent that women invest their private accounts in
low-risk, low-yield assets, they will fail to realize the full purported
benefits of privatization in the form of higher (albeit riskier) returns. 76
Thus, differences in investment behavior could exacerbate disparities
in the levels of retirement security for women and men under a
cost-of-living adjustment from 3.5 percent to 2.5 percent would erode the purchasing
power of benefits by 22 percent after 25 years); see also MICHAEL J. BOSKIN ET AL.,
ADVISORY COMM'N TO STUDY THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, TOWARD A MORE ACCURATE
MEASURE OF THE COST OF LIVING, 104th CONG., 2D SESS. 1, 55-56 (Comm. Print 1996)
(concluding that consumer price index overstates actual rate of price inflation and thus
overcompensates beneficiaries for changes in true cost of living).
73 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 20, at 12.
74 See id. at 13.
75 See id at 9-10 (noting "evidence suggesting that women are generally
more risk averse than men in financial decisionmaking"); see also Richard P. Hinz et al.,
Are Women More Conservative Investors? Gender Differences in Participant-Directed
Pension Investments, in POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 91, 99-
100 (Michael S. Gordon et al. eds., 1997) (analyzing data on participants in the federal
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), and concluding that "women appear to invest their pension
assets more conservatively than men").
76 Nevertheless, proponents of privatization reject the notion that women
would achieve lower investment returns than men under a privatized system. See
ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 123 (statement of Joan T. Bok et al.) ("We
know of no evidence that women systematically make inferior investment choices.").
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privatized system. 7 Of course, improved financial education might
help both men and women to make better investment decisions, but it
is unclear how this would be accomplished under a privatized
system .78
Women may also face a disadvantage in the annuities market
when they begin to draw down their private accounts. The existing
market for annuities is quite thin, due in part to problems of adverse
selection, and the cost of annuities tends to be correspondingly high
compared to the present value of the stream of annuity payments.79
Reliance on the annuity market raises the further issue of whether
private insurers should be permitted to use sex-differentiated mortality
tables in issuing individual annuity policies. 80  Under sex-
differentiated tables, men and women of the same age who purchase
individual annuities for identical lump-sum payments would receive
different monthly benefits. Despite their equivalence in present value
terms, the women's monthly benefits would be lower than the men's,
due to the difference in their life expectancies.8' Thus, even if the
77 See Hinz et al., supra note 75, at 99.
78 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 20, at 14. Numerous studies suggest
that the overall level of financial literacy is extremely low. See B. Douglas Bernheim,
Adequacy of Savings for Retirement and the Role of Economic Literacy, in RETIREMENT
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: READY OR NOT? 73, 80 (Dallas L. Salisbury & Nora Super Jones
eds., 1994).
79 See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 71 (stating that "private
annuities typically do not offer a fair return for the average person"); see also OLIVIA S.
MITCHELL ET AL., NEW EVIDENCE ON THE MONEY'S WORTH OF INDIVIDUAL ANNUITIES 2
(National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6002, 1997) (concluding that
expected present value of annuity payments per premium dollar is "well below unity,"
i.e., 80 to 85 percent for an average 65-year-old). By creating a much larger pool of
potential annuitants, a privatized system might ameliorate imperfections in the existing
annuities market.
80 Insurers are prohibited from using sex-differentiated actuarial tables to
calculate benefits under group annuity policies issued as part of an employee benefit plan,
but no such prohibition applies in the case of individual annuity policies. See JAN
WALLISER, CONG. BUDGET OFF., SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION AND THE ANNUITIES
MARKET 12 (Feb. 1998) ("with the exception of TIAA-CREF, [insurers] do differentiate
individual annuity holders by sex"); see also Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred
Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1079-86 (1983)
(holding that Title VII prohibits employers from offering retirement annuities based on
sex-differentiated actuarial tables).
81 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 20, at 10-11; see also id. at 12 n.16
(noting concern about whether insurers would issue individual annuities if they were
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women and the men had identical contributions, investment outcomes,
and account balances at retirement, the women might end up with
substantially lower annuity payments and a correspondingly lower
standard of living in retirement. This outcome might be perceived as
unfair compared to the current system, which emphasizes "equal
living standards for equal contributions. '8 2 These problems could, of
course, be addressed by-mandating the use of unisex tables, with their
concomitant redistribution in favor of women.
C. Women as Wives and Widows
One incidental effect of privatization would be to reduce
disparities between one-earner and two-earner married couples.
Indeed, in a fully privatized system, with no derivative benefits for
spouses or survivors, such disparities would disappear completely.
Although neither the IA plan nor the PSA plan goes this far, the PSA
plan takes a long step in the direction of full privatization. Under the
PSA plan, derivative benefits would still be.available for spouses and
survivors, but the scope of these benefits would be sharply
constrained by the conspicuously low level of the flat first-tier benefit.
Concerns about the long-term viability of the non-privatized portion
of the system cast further doubt on the role of derivative benefits
under the PSA plan.
The PSA plan would substantially narrow the existing gap
between one-earner and two-earner couples. Proponents argue that
"women would generally fare relatively well" under the PSA plan,
asserting that "[t]he more typical situation for women in the future
will be that of being a partner in a two-earner couple, where both
spouses have had relatively full working careers." 83 Higher returns to
two-earner couples under a privatized system, however, would not
necessarily mean greater protection for surviving spouses. Due to
differences in age at marriage and in longevity, most women will
spend a significant portion of their retirement years alone. For older
required to use unisex tables).
2Jd. at 15.
83 ADVISORY CouNcIL REP., supra note 9, at 124 (statement of Joan T. Bok et
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women, who on average may expect to remain widowed for 17 years,
the death of a husband represents a "risky economic transition."
84
Even in a two-earner couple, the surviving spouse may be worse off
under a privatized system unless she inherits her deceased spouse's
private account.
The existing system provides a mandatory survivor benefit for
a deceased worker's eligible surviving spouse. By comparison,
neither the IA plan nor the PSA plan would ensure the same level of
protection for the surviving spouse. The IA plan would require that
each private account be paid out either to the worker as a single-life
annuity or to the worker and the spouse as an actuarially equivalent
joint-and-survivor annuity. 85 The joint-and-survivor annuity would be
the default setting in the case of a married couple, but with the
spouse's consent the worker could elect to receive a single-life
annuity instead. This aspect of the IA plan is modeled on the
treatment of qualified pension plans under ERISA, which permits a
participant to waive the joint-and-survivor annuity with the written
consent of the non-participant spouse. 86 The ERISA provision was
added in 1984 to provide a measure of protection for the surviving
spouse of a deceased participant.87 Although the percentage of
pension benefits paid in the form of joint-and-survivor annuities has
increased substantially since the enactment of this provision, nearly 25
percent of all married participants continue to elect alternative forms
of payment.
88
84 BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 4, at 2.
85 The joint-and-survivor annuity would pay lower benefits while both
spouses were alive but would continue to pay benefits to the surviving spouse for life.
See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 28.86 See 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1994).
87 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 71, at 6 ("This requirement [of
written spousal consent] was prompted partly by testimony before the Congress by
widows who stated that they were financially unprepared at their husbands' death because
they were unaware of their husbands' choice not to take a joint and survivor annuity.
Through the spousal consent requirement, the Congress envisioned that, among other
things, a greater percentage of married men would retain the joint and survivor annuity
and give their spouses the opportunity to receive survivor benefits."). See also Camilla E.
Watson, Broken Promises Revisited: The Window of Vulnerability for Surviving Spouses
Under ERISA, 76 IOWA L. REV. 431, 472-86 (199 1).
88 See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 154 n.27 (statement of Edith
U. Fierst).
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The PSA plan would provide even less protection for
surviving spouses. It would permit a retired worker to withdraw the
balance in his or her private account either in a lump sum or in
installments. By lifting all restrictions on the form of payments, the
PSA plan exposes retired workers and their spouses to an increased
risk of poverty in old age. For example, a husband and wife who
retire at age 62 in 2010 would have to estimate their consumption
needs for a period of nearly 30 years.8 9 If their resources turn out to
be inadequate, most of the hardship is likely to fall on the wife, who
can be expected to survive her husband for a prolonged period.
Unlike the PSA plan, the IA plan would at least give the surviving
spouse the right to receive annuity payments for her life. While such
protection might ultimately fall short of the spouse's needs, the IA
plan comes much closer than the PSA plan to providing adequate
benefits for surviving spouses.
III. OPTIONS FOR REFORM
Much of the debate over social security reform appears to be
fueled less by different assessments of the likely economic
consequences of privatization than by divergent political expectations
and value judgments. 90 While privatization may be attractive to those
who place a high value on individual equity and unconstrained
personal choice, the plans outlined by proponents of privatization
raise serious concerns in terms of their likely impact on women. In
particular, the PSA plan is open to criticism for its refusal to
incorporate two features of special significance for women: earnings
sharing and mandatory annuitization. In considering alternative
reform proposals, it is important to recognize that privatization is
conceptually distinct from, but by no means incompatible with,
earnings sharing and mandatory annuitization. Indeed, both features
could be accommodated either within a privatized system or within
the existing system.
89 See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 4, at 10.
90 See Diamond, supra note 16, at 40, 63.
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A. Earnings Sharing
Even proponents of privatization concede that the PSA plan
has "serious shortcomings with respect to 'women's well-being." 91 In
particular, unrestricted individual ownership of private accounts could
leave many widows worse' off than under the existing system. The
PSA plan would permit a retired worker to spend down his or her
private account or leave any remaining balance at death, to other
beneficiaries, with no obligation to share any portion with a spouse.
As critics have observed, the PSA plan would provide "new
opportunities for financial abandonment" of spouses.
92
This problem could be ameliorated through mandatory
earnings sharing. Under one proposal, known as the "personal
security system" (PSS) plan, the aggregate contributions of each
married couple would be split equally between the spouses, and each
spouse's share would be deposited in his or her individual private
account. 93 This approach would protect the lower-wage or non-wage-
earning spouse by crediting her private account with a portion of the
higher-wage spouse's earnings. Under the PSS plan, no amounts
could be withdrawn from an individual's private account until age 65.
At age 65, account balances of all cohort members would be pooled
together and the government would purchase a single-life annuity for
each cohort member in proportion to the balance in his or her private
account. The PSS plan would also provide a redistributive component
by requiring matching contributions from the government to the
private accounts of low-wage earners "on a progressive basis."
94
Using the PSS plan as the baseline, one study purports to
demonstrate empirically that women would be "significantly better
off' under a fully privatized system with earnings sharing than under
91 EKATERINA SHIRLEY & PETER SPIEGLER, THE BENEFITS OF SOCIAL
SECURITY PRIVATIZATION FOR WOMEN 7 (Cato Project on Soc. Security Privatization No.
12, 1998).
92 ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 72 (statement of Robert M. Ball
et al.).
93 See Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Jeffrey Sachs, It's High Time to Privatize, 15
BROOKINGS REV. 16, 20 (Summer 1997).
94 See id. In order to finance'the transition from the existing system, the PSS
plan would impose a value-added or retail sales tax initially set at around 10 percent and
declining to a permanent 2 percent tax over a 40-year period. Id. at 22.
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the existing system.95 On closer inspection, however, the claim that
privatization would offer "tangible financial benefits to women"
seems overdrawn. 96  The effects of earnings sharing should not be
confused with those of privatization; the two concepts are analytically
distinct. Thus, given the wage differential between men and women,
it should come as no surprise that women as a group would gain from
earnings sharing. This gain, however, should not be portrayed as an
advantage of privatization.
97
If earnings sharing is desirable, it can be accommodated either
within a system of private accounts or within a collective social
security system. 98  Nevertheless, as a practical matter, it might be
easier to implement earnings sharing as part of a more general
transition to a privatized system. A system of private accounts would
establish a much closer linkage between individual contributions and
benefits, but might also raise serious problems of social adequacy.
Even if average benefits remained unchanged, the elimination of
spousal and survivor benefits in a privatized system would
fundamentally change the existing distribution of benefits among
various types of families.99 The biggest winners would be high-wage
two-earner couples.
95 See SHIRLEY & SPIEGLER, supra note 91, at 16.
96 Id. Indeed, it is not at all clear that investing payroll contributions in the
stock market would make everyone better off. See John Geanakoplos et al., Would a
Privatized Social Security System Really Pay a Higher Rate of Return?, in FRAMING THE
SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE: VALUES, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 137, 148 (R. Douglas
Arnold et al. eds., 1998) (noting that the argument "ignores transition costs... [and] does
not account for changes in risk borne by participants").
97 The study also ignores transition costs and implicitly assigns a zero value
to the insurance component of defined-benefit plans. See SHIRLEY & SPIEGLER, supra
note 91, at 14.
98 See Michael J. Boskin et al., Personal Security Accounts: A Proposal for
Fundamental Social Security Reform, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE PENSIONS:
PROVIDING FOR RETIREMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 179 (Susan M. Wachter ed.,
1988) (proposing an individual account system with earnings sharing and progressive
matching within social security). Boskin's proposal should not be confused with the
similarly-named PSA plan; the two proposals are fundamentally different.
99 See Diamond, supra note 16, at 47-48.
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B. Mandatory Annuitization
No serious privatization proposal can ignore the issue of
annuitization. The PSA plan would permit individual workers to
withdraw any part or all of their private accounts at retirement and to
leave any remaining balance at death to other beneficiaries.
Proponents of the PSA plan considered, but rejected, the possibility of
requiring that some minimal level of benefits be paid out in the form
of an annuity.100 The rejection of mandatory annuitization reflects a
view of private accounts as an accumulation of unrestricted personal
wealth rather than as an earmarked source of retirement income. 10'
According to this view, mandatory annuitization would encourage
unduly high levels of consumption and penalize "thrifty" retirees who
might desire to "preserve some of their PSA accumulations to pass on
to their heirs."'10
2
The PSA plan highlights a fundamental contradiction between
the rationale for forced retirement saving and the view of private
accounts as fungible personal wealth. If workers must be forced to
save during their working years to provide a source of income during
retirement, it seems unrealistic to assume that they will suddenly
become optimally rational and prudent decisionmakers upon
retirement. 03 Moreover, the PSA plan would be likely to create
intense political pressure to permit early withdrawals from private
accounts. Just as voluntary pre-tax retirement accounts can be tapped
under present law for specified purposes (e.g., to purchase a home,
finance an education or pay medical expenses), it would be surprising
1oo See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 17 (statement of Joan T.
Bok et al.) (suggesting that retired workers might be required to hold annuities with some
minimum payout (e.g., 150 percent of poverty level) to prevent them from spending down
assets quickly and becoming "a burden on public assistance programs").
1o1 See Peter A. Diamond, Macroeconomic Aspects of Social Security Reform,
in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1, 45 (1997) (noting political issues
raised by contrasting views of "wealth entitlement" and "retirement income entitlement").
02 ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 117 (statement of Joan T. Bok
et al.).
103 See id. at 157 (statement of Edward M. Gramlich and Marc M. Twinney).
("The government is in effect saying to people that it does not trust them to save for the
future when they are younger than 62, so it requires them to hold PSAs. But once these
people become 62 they suddenly become wise and responsible, and the government no
longer requires them to preserve their assets beyond that date").
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if private accounts remained truly untouchable until retirement.' °04
If private accounts could be drawn down relatively easily
before retirement, some workers would find themselves without
adequate resources when they reached retirement age. Even those
who maintained their private accounts intact until retirement might
exhaust their resources as a result of poor planning or catastrophic
events such as illness. Since annuities function as insurance against
living too long, the principal beneficiaries of mandatory annuitization
would be long-lived workers and their surviving spouses. The same
group, made up predominantly of women, is likely to suffer the
greatest hardship, especially in extreme old age, in the absence of
mandatory annuitization.
05
Unlike the PSA plan, the IA plan would require annuitization
of account balances at retirement. The default option for a married
worker would be a joint-and-survivor annuity for the lives of the
respective spouses, but with spousal consent a worker could elect a
single-life annuity instead. In the analogous context of private
pensions, a couple's choice between a single-life or joint-and-survivor
annuity may depend on several factors. A joint-and-survivor annuity
provides continued protection after the worker's death for the
surviving spouse, at the cost of reduced annuity payments while both
spouses are living. This option may be attractive to financially secure
couples whose standard of living will not be seriously affected by
reduced annuity payments, especially if they expect a prolonged
widowhood for the surviving spouse and if they have relatively few
other disposable assets.'
°6
Although economists often treat the household as a
"decisionmaking unit with a single (joint) lifetime utility function,"
this model does not provide a persuasive explanation of actual
104 See Lawrence H. Thompson, Individual Uncertainty in Retirement Income
Planning Under Different Public Pension Regimes, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY
DEBATE: VALUES, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 113, 132 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds.,
1998) (noting that existing law permits early withdrawals for home purchases and for
medical or educational expenses, with the result that "a substantial portion of what is set
aside in individual retirement savings programs may be dissipated prior to retirement").
105 See Hurd, supra note 33, at 223.
106 See Holden, supra note 12, at 365.
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behavior in making annuitization decisions.10 7  For example, the
percentage of single-life annuities elected by married participants in
private pension plans declined dramatically following the enactment
of a spousal consent provision in 1984, which suggests that
unconstrained choice under prior law may have failed to maximize
household utility. 08  Even with the spousal consent requirement,
many couples still waive the joint-and-survivor annuity option in
favor of a single-life annuity. In some cases, waiving protection for
the surviving spouse may rationally maximize the couple's joint
utility based on factors such as the health and life expectancy of the
respective spouses. 109 Critics argue, however, that the spousal consent
requirement by itself may provide inadequate protection for the
surviving spouse due to poor information or unequal bargaining
power.110
In the context of private pension plans, a couple's waiver of a
joint-and-survivor annuity may put the surviving spouse's financial
security at risk. Indeed, for some widows, the loss of pension benefits
at the death of a husband signals a significant decline in economic
status."' As long as private pensions operate as a supplement to basic
survivor protection, it may be reasonable to allow a range of payout
options. However, if basic survivor protection is sharply reduced or
eliminated in a privatized system, joint-and-survivor annuity benefits
should be mandatory rather than optional for married couples.
Ensuring a minimum level of protection for survivors should take
precedence over the use of private accounts for bequests or other
purposes unrelated to retirement security. Mandatory annuitization
would also help to mitigate problems of adverse selection and bring
down the cost of annuities.' 12
107 See Diamond, supra note 101, at 56.
"0 See id. at 56-57 ("If there were a single household maximization, the
Retirement Equity Act would not have had any effect on the choice between single and
joint life annuities.").
109 See Holden, supra note 12, at 367.
'0 See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 154 n.27 (statement of
Edith U. Fierst).
111 See Holden, supra note 12, at 361.
1 2 Mandatory annuitization, if based on uniform national mortality statistics,
would discriminate against groups with short life expectancies, including some minority
groups. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 117 (statement of Joan T. Bok et
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It might seem that an adequate level of survivor protection
could be achieved by requiring that only part of the balance in private
accounts be annuitized. Though perhaps politically attractive, such a
compromise solution would raise sensitive issues concerning the
appropriate level of annuitization 1 13  To avoid too sharp a drop in
living standards, the minimum annuity might have to be set by
reference to pre-retirement wages rather than a lower poverty index.'
14
If early withdrawals were permitted, it would be necessary to monitor
fluctuating balances in private accounts to ensure that there would be
sufficient funds at retirement to purchase a target-level annuity. In
addition, annuity payments would have to be indexed for inflation to
preserve the real value of the required minimum benefits.
Requiring that a married couple receive benefits in the form of
a joint-and-survivor annuity would allocate the available benefits
more equally between the spouses over time and redistribute income
to the lower-wage, longer-lived spouse. Although this might provide
a modest windfall for some survivors, more accurate targeting of
benefits would not be costless. Furthermore, a relatively well-off
couple would be free to neutralize the effects of mandatory
annuitization by using other assets for non-retirement spending or
bequests. Given the current state of knowledge concerning bequest
behavior, it is impossible to predict what effect, if any, mandatory
al.); Diamond, supra note 101, at 57. The annuity feature of the existing benefit system
has also been criticized as having an adverse impact on these groups. The overall fairness
of the existing benefit structure is difficult to assess, however, because other features have
opposite or countervailing effects. See Burke & McCouch, supra-note 11, at 1231 n. 124.
13 See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 117 (statement of Joan T.
Bok et al.). Cf Kent A. Smetters, Thinking About Social Security's Trust Fund, in
POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 201, 214 (Michael S. Gordon et
al. eds., 1997) (arguing that full annuitization may not be optimal, and that "[a]t least
some lump-sum disbursement will be desirable for the purpose of making a bequest,
giving inter-vivos transfers to children (e.g., as a down payment on a house), or holding a
buffer for medical and non-medical expenses faced by beneficiaries and their heirs").
14 See WALLISER, supra note 80, at 31 (describing Chilean system, which
permits lump sum withdrawals as long as the remaining balance is sufficient to finance a
specified minimum annuity); cf Jonathan Barry Forman, Whose Pension Is It Anyway?
Protecting Spousal Rights in a Privatized Social Security System, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1653,
1682 (1998) (suggesting 125 percent of poverty level).
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annuitization would have on the level of bequests. 1 5 If amounts
accumulated in private accounts substantially exceed the levels
needed to maintain pre-retirement standards of living, one solution
might be to limit tax-favored treatment for excess accumulations of
retirement funds.' 1
6
C. Improving Survivor Benefits
In the current debate over privatization, it is easy to overlook
the full range of options for reforming the existing system. One
moderate proposal that deserves more careful consideration
recommends a cost-neutral approach to reducing the economic risk of
poverty among elderly widows. Even if the controversy over
disparate treatment of one-earner and two-earner couples cannot be
fully resolved, this proposal would provide enhanced protection for an
especially vulnerable group and thereby help to allay perceptions of
"unfairness" to women under the existing system.' 17  Improving
survivor benefits represents an important incremental reform that
would help fulfill "one of the unmet social goals set by the framers of
the Social Security system."' 18
The existing system provides relatively greater benefits for a
married couple than for a surviving spouse. The cost-neutral proposal
would shift a portion of the couple's benefits to the surviving spouse,
while holding the spouses' combined lifetime benefits constant. As a
result, the couple would receive lower benefits while both spouses
were living, but after the first spouse's death the survivor would
receive higher benefits. For example, the survivor benefit might be
115 See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Uneasy Empirical Case for Abolishing the
Estate Tax, 51 TAX L. REV. 495, 507-11 (1996). Life insurance provides another means
of offsetting the effects of excessive annuitization. See Diamond, supra note 101, at 57.
116 Mandatory annuitization may seem objectionable on the ground that it
would leave workers exposed to fluctuations in the market for annuities, which may be
quite sensitive to changes in interest rates and stock market prices. See ADVISORY
COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 117 (statement of Joan T. Bok et al.). This problem,
however, is inherent in any defined-contribution system. See Diamond, supra note 16, at
40-45 (noting that defined-contribution system places market risk "squarely on the
individual worker," while defined-benefit system permits "wider pooling of risks").
17 See Sandell & lams, supra note 18, at 293.
11 Holden, supra note 27, at 101.
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set equal to 75 percent of the combined benefits received by the
couple while both spouses were living. 19 Since married couples face
a relatively low risk of poverty, this reallocation of benefits would be
a relatively target-efficient way to promote social adequacy under the
existing system. The proposal would generate an increase of around
$1.45 in the survivor benefit for each $1 reduction in the combined
benefits of a typical couple while both spouses were living. 20 As
long as the reallocation of benefits remained actuarially fair, the net
cost to social security would be zero.
Reallocating benefits from couples to surviving spouses would
ameliorate the high rate of poverty among elderly widows. At the
same time, the proposal would also reduce the existing disparity in
survivor benefits between one-earner and two-earner couples. The
survivor benefit would be set equal to a uniform percentage of the
couple's combined benefits, regardless of the division of wages
between husband and wife. In the case of a two-earner couple, the
secondary earner's contributions would no longer be "wasted" but
would generate an increased survivor benefit. Thus, one-earner
couples would no longer receive better survivor protection than two-
earner couples. 12 1 While both spouses were living, however, one-
earner couples would continue to enjoy more favorable treatment than
two-earner couples.
If spousal benefits represent an unwarranted subsidy for
traditional families, one solution might be a general reduction in
spousal benefits coupled with a corresponding increase in survivor
benefits. 122 The burden of such a reduction in spousal benefits would
fall primarily on one-earner couples, but the reduction in their spousal
benefits would be partially offset by the increase in their survivor
benefits. For women entitled to worker-only benefits, the reduction in
119 See BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 4, at 13; see also Sandell &
lams, supra note 18, at 284-85.
120 See Sandell & lams, supra note 18, at 280. See also ADVISORY COUNCIL
REP., supra note 9, at 144 (statement of Edith U. Fierst).
121 See Holden, supra note 27, at 101-02.
122 See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 144 (statement of Edith U.
Fierst) (noting that implementation of an actuarially fair survivor benefit of 75 percent
would mean reducing the spousal benefit from its present 50 percent level to around 20
percent).
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spousal benefits would have no effect at all. For two-earner couples
in which the secondary earner is dually-entitled, depending on the
level of spousal benefits, the change might reduce somewhat the
couple's combined benefits, but again the reduction would be partially
offset by the increase in survivor benefits.
123
From a policy perspective, some variants of benefit-shifting
may be more attractive than others. While increasing survivor
benefits would help most women, reducing spousal benefits would
have the greatest impact on the 5 percent of future couples in which
the secondary earner (typically the wife) is expected to receive
spouse-only benefits. Couples retiring in the future with spouse-only
benefits may well have other resources sufficient to provide an
adequate level of retirement income. Since the primary goal of the
proposal is to improve the economic security of widows,' 24 not all
women would benefit and some might be worse off. For example,
lower spousal benefits would adversely affect divorced women whose
ex-husbands were still alive; these women would benefit from higher
survivor benefits after the death of their ex-husbands, however, to the
same extent as other widows. Never-married women (and men)
would not be affected by a cost-neutral reform that merely reallocated
benefits among married couples. While hardly a panacea, the
proposal to reduce spousal benefits and increase survivor benefits
would serve much the same purposes as the joint-and-survivor annuity
provisions of ERISA and might well improve both equity and
adequacy in the existing system.
The proposal to reallocate benefits focuses attention on the
important distinction between spousal benefits and survivor benefits.
Though often linked together for analytical purposes, these two types
of derivative benefits serve quite different functions.125  Spousal
benefits no longer redistribute to women who are in greatest need, nor
123 See Sandell & lams, supra note 18, at 294.
124 As long as widows continue to have a significantly higher poverty rate
than married couples, benefit-shifting should improve overall adequacy. The gains might
be less than expected, however, if official poverty-level guidelines mismeasure the
poverty of surviving spouses relative to married couples. See Hurd, supra note 33, at 223.
125 See Holden, supra note 27, at 101 (noting that spousal and survivor
benefits "perform different functions and need not be directly linked in reform
proposals").
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can they be defended on grounds of equity; there is a strong case to be
made for reducing or eliminating them. 126  By contrast, survivor
benefits still have a crucial role to play in promoting adequacy;
although the formula for calculating survivor benefits can and should
be reformed to reduce disparities between one-earner and two-earner
couples, the overall level of these benefits should not be cut back.
The debate over fairness to one-earner and two-earner couples should
not stand in the way of specific, concrete reforms that would
ameliorate the risk of poverty for older women. Remedying the gap
in economic well-being between older women and men remains "the
most pressing unfinished business of social policy toward the
aged."'
127
CONCLUSION
In assessing alternative proposals for social security reform, it
is important to examine how each proposal would affect the economic
well being of various groups. Although the redistributive features of
the existing system tend to benefit women overall, there is still a
substantial disparity between women and men in economic security in
retirement and old age. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that most
women would fare better under a privatized system. Instead of
narrowing the gap between women and men, current privatization
proposals threaten to curtail the redistributive features of the existing
system and increase the risk of poverty for elderly widows. By
contrast, moderate reform of the existing benefit structure could
provide substantially better protection for especially vulnerable
groups such as widows while mitigating disparities between one-
earner and two-earner couples. Of course, under any reform proposal,
as under the existing system, some groups will inevitably fare better
than others, given the tension between goals of social adequacy and
individual equity.' 28 Nevertheless, it would be a serious mistake to
126 Nevertheless, an across-the-board reduction in spousal benefits would
raise a serious problem of adequacy for divorced women.
127 BURKHAUSER & SMEEDING, supra note 4, at 7.
128 See Joseph F. Quinn, Criteria for Evaluating Social Security Reform, in
19991 405
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
remove the component of social adequacy from federal retirement
policy; basic needs that are not met through social security will
reappear in the form of claims for means-tested public assistance.1
29
The allure of high returns and individual control in a privatized
system should not obscure the accompanying risks and social costs.
For most women, as for most Americans, there is a real stake in
preserving a politically viable and financially stable system of
collective security in retirement and old age.
POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 37, 54 (Michael S. Gordon et al.
eds., 1997) ("Income redistribution explicitly treats different people differently - that is
the point of it.").
29 See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 9, at 71 (statement of Robert M.
Ball et al.) (warning that'PSA plan "might well end up trading Social Security for an
enlarged SSI program plus a compulsory savings plan").
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